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**Iraq: Policy Of Containment—An Analysis On Why It Has Failed And What To Do Next**

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## **Introduction**

It has been nearly twelve years and three United States (U.S.) presidential administrations since the United Nations (UN) coalition overwhelmingly defeated Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Immediately after Iraq's defeat, the first Bush administration unofficially indicated its desire for Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to eventually fall from power—although it made it clear to the American people that it was not a primary U.S. objective or condition to end hostilities. With no definitive strategy to ensure that this eventually happen, the administration, and those to follow, settled upon a policy of containment in an effort to prevent Saddam from rebuilding his military forces, including his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Under the control of the UN, a series of diplomatic, military, and economic constraints were implemented with the ultimate goal of maintaining regional stability. The UN allowed for humanitarian exemptions to this policy in order for Saddam to meet the non-military needs of his people.

The UN policy of containment towards post-Gulf War Iraq has fractured and has been an abysmal failure. The Iraqi regime, under the dictatorial leadership of Saddam Hussein, has significantly rearmed and there is clear evidence that his WMD programs are more advanced now than before the Gulf War—including significant progress made towards development of nuclear armaments. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the U.S., in concert with the UN, take immediate measures to reexamine its containment policy and put in place a renewed UN-sponsored WMD inspection regime. If success should continue to elude the U.S. and its allies, they will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive military strike to bring about the long awaited Iraqi regime change, assuring once and for all the destruction of Iraq's WMD.

The first part of the essay that follows will conduct a strategic analysis of the failed policy of containment utilizing the analytical framework of *ends, means, and ways*. It will begin with a

discussion of U.S. national interests and objectives with regard to Iraq—*the ends*—and the assumptions in the domestic and international environments that influenced their development. It will continue with an in-depth analysis of the threat—highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion will then turn to the instruments of state power—*the means*—and how they have been applied—*the ways*—towards the Iraqi regime since the end of the Gulf War in an effort to achieve *the ends*. This portion of the discussion will focus on the coercive policy of containment and offer some thoughts as to why it has essentially failed. Finally, the analysis will conclude with a discussion of some of the constraints that impinge upon the U.S.’s ability to have freedom of action in the Gulf region and continue to limit its ability to develop additional policy options. Part one of the essay will conclude with a recommendation for a renewed non-military strategy offered as a potential solution to the current Iraqi dilemma.

The second part of this essay will assume that the previous recommended strategy does not achieve the desired results and that the use of military force will become necessary. A second strategic analysis will be conducted that specifically addresses the impending use of military force. The framework for discussion will focus on the following six key elements: (1) political setting and stated/implicit objectives, (2) military strategic setting, (3) military objectives, (4) military capabilities and vulnerabilities, (5) the strategic concept, and (6) potential results.

### **National Interests, International/Domestic Assumptions, And Objectives**

The Bush Administration in the recently released National Security Strategy (NSS), has stated that the U.S. goal for national security strategy “...is to help make the world not just safer but better,” and broadly defined three national interests, “...political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”<sup>1</sup> From these broad national

interests the U.S. has further developed four specific political objectives that drive U.S. policy toward Iraq: (1) preventing Iraq from gaining regional influence, particularly over the oil-rich Gulf states; (2) stopping Iraq from building WMD [including ballistic missiles]; (3) removing Saddam from power; and (4) preserving the stability of U.S. allies in the region.<sup>2</sup> Although the priority of these objectives has shifted slightly in recent years and Saddam's removal from power (a.k.a. "regime change") has only recently been re-emphasized as a top objective, the objectives have for the most part remained as they were developed following the Gulf War.

During development of the previously stated objectives, several analytical assumptions were made and are important to consider. First, although the U.S. and its allies did not directly target Saddam prior to the conclusion of the Gulf War, they assumed that thereafter he would quickly fall from power, either through assassination or coup. Obviously, this assumption proved to be incorrect. Saddam continues to live and prosper and frustrates our ability to contain him. Thus, there is reason for now re-emphasizing his removal as a stated objective. Second, U.S. policy makers correctly assumed that Saddam could not be trusted. Although it was hoped that he would comply with the imposed UN resolutions, most believed that economic pressure and the threat of military force would be required for successful compliance. Third, the U.S. feared increased Iranian influence in the region. The U.S. assumed that if it supported the Iraqi Shiites, then Iran, which has a large population of Shiites, would likely intervene and seize part of Iraq. Thus, the U.S. sought objectives that would minimize Iran's influence and maintain stability. Fourth, policy makers assumed that the anti-Iraqi coalition assembled during the Gulf War would continue to be required to effectively contain Iraq post-conflict. And fifth, the U.S. mistakenly believed that it and the allies had knocked out a great majority of the WMD during

the war and that which remained was rather limited in scope.<sup>3</sup> Once again and in retrospect, this assumption made by post-war policy makers now appears to have been a poor one.

### **The Threat**

In April of 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 and required Iraq to destroy, remove, or make harmless its WMD and to also cease future development of WMD. In theory, the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would ensure compliance. Iraq, however, has failed to live up to its obligations. Baghdad has been determined to hold onto as much of its arsenal, equipment, and expertise as possible by using its elite security services to conceal, deceive, and outright obstruct the inspection process. The UN in response has passed several additional resolutions, specifically, UNSCR 707 (Aug 91), UNSCR 715 (Oct 91), UNSCR 1051 and 1284 (Dec 91), all of which seek Iraq's compliance with the original resolution passed in 1991. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM--later named UNMOVIC) and IAEA are the designated enforcing agencies. Between 1991 and 1997 (with the exception of 1993 when Iraq briefly prevented UNMOVIC access but relinquished following several air strikes) inspectors made what was considered significant progress towards disarming Iraq's WMD and missile programs. Since 1998 however, Iraq has refused to allow any inspectors into the country as required by Security Council resolutions. Additionally, since the last time inspectors were allowed into Iraq in 1998, Iraq has dismantled UN-installed technical monitoring systems at known or suspected WMD/missile facilities.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the lack of inspectors on the ground in Iraq since 1998, reliable intelligence sources are convinced that Iraq has begun a renewed production of chemical warfare (CW) agents, most likely cyclosarin, sarin, VX, and mustard. Although UNSCOM inspectors believe they were

initially successful in limiting Iraq's CW threat to pre-Gulf War quantities, intelligence sources now report that Iraq possesses a few hundred metric tons of CW agents and is rapidly producing more. In contrast, it is believed that Iraq's biological weapon (BW) capability is larger and more advanced than pre-Gulf War. Iraq has both lethal and incapacitating BW agents, including anthrax, all of which are highly concealed and produced in highly mobile facilities.<sup>5</sup>

Iraq's missile capability remains small but still poses a significant threat. It is believed that Iraq possesses a covert force of a few dozen Scud-variant Short Range Ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges between 650-900 kms. Additionally, Iraq is developing the new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, both of which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150 km range limit. Iraq now also possesses UAV capabilities that can be used as delivery vehicles for both CW and BW agents. It is also believed that Iraq is actively developing medium-range ballistic missiles largely through foreign assistance and despite economic sanctions.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps most troubling of all is what most analysts agree is Iraq's active and robust nuclear weapons program, despite more than ten years of sanctions and IAEA oversight. Iraq has withheld numerous documents from IAEA inspectors in an effort to conceal its nuclear facilities and activities. Since 1998 all of the IAEA's efforts to dismantle Iraq's program have for the most part been reversed. Iraq has successfully retained numerous nuclear scientists and dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Most agree the only thing preventing Iraq from developing a nuclear weapon is its inability to acquire a sufficient amount of fissile material. Intelligence sources have reported that Iraq's nuclear program has advanced to the point that if it were to get a sufficient quantity of fissile material from abroad, it would be able to develop a weapon within one year. If it must continue to rely on

producing the fissile material indigenously, then it would have a nuclear weapon later in this decade.<sup>7</sup>

From a conventional threat perspective and despite the significant bashing that it received during the Gulf War, Iraq still has the largest military power in the gulf. It has made a significant effort to rebuild despite continued UN sanctions. Iraq now possesses approximately 400,000 active duty personnel (375,000 in the Army) and the ability to mobilize up to 400,000 additional reservists. They still have 2,200 main battle tanks (down from the Pre-Gulf war number of 5,500), 3,700 other armed vehicles (down from 10,000), 2,200 major artillery weapons (down from 3,700), 70-90 armed helicopters (down from 160), 316 combat aircraft (down from 500), 140-160 major SAMs (down from 320), 500-700 light SAMs (down from 1,000-1,500), and some 3,000 AAA guns (down from 4,000-6,000).<sup>8</sup> “The six heavy armored and mechanized divisions in the regular army, and the four heavy armored and mechanized divisions in the Republican guard, now have about 65% of the major weapons numbers they had in 1990.”<sup>9</sup> In sum, the Iraqi military is still very capable and well trained. The air force can generate several hundred sorties a day for several days and the air defense sector has proven itself very survivable despite numerous attempts to defeat it by the U.S. and the British. Despite Iraq’s relatively “good” condition in terms of conventional weapons, it still suffers from a poorly trained conscript force, many of whom are Shiites and of questionable loyalty.<sup>10</sup>

So one would logically ask at this point: is Saddam a threat to the maintenance of regional stability and is he a threat to the world at large? The answer by most Americans would likely be a resounding, “Yes.” Saddam’s history of aggression, his continued intransigence towards UN weapons inspections despite numerous attempts to seek compliance, and his clear desire to acquire WMD make it clear that he is a threat to peace and stability and must be disarmed.



President George W. Bush in his recent speech in Cincinnati where he outlined the Iraqi threat to the American public stated, “ We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. Since we all agree on this goal, the issues are: how can we best achieve it?”

### **Means and Ways**

Now that the objectives—*the ends*—and the threat have been clearly stated we turn our attention towards the *means and ways*—also known as the *tools and methods*—to achieve those ends. The four fundamental “power tools” that strategists use in formulating policy to achieve national interests are: diplomatic, economic, military, and information. These tools are applied in a number of conceptually different ways and can run the full spectrum from forced military intervention to peace keeping and nation building. The following discussion will focus on one of these broad conceptual applications—containment—how it has been applied to the Iraqi threat since the Gulf War, and why it has begun to show recent signs of failure.

**Containment Defined:** Containment is a form of denial that requires skillful diplomacy and strong international cooperation to be made effective. Skillfully executed, as it was against the USSR during the Cold War, it can work well in the non-proliferation of WMD.

Iraq has been under the policy of containment since the end of the Gulf War. There are five key elements that blend together to define containment as it applies to Iraq: (1) economic sanctions, (2) intrusive UN inspections of Iraq’s WMD and missiles, (3) diplomatic isolation, (4) restricting Iraq’s deployment of forces, and (5) a large western military presence in the gulf.<sup>11</sup>

**Economic Sanctions:** Sanctions were originally placed on Iraq immediately following its invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 and have been in place ever since. It has been estimated that Saddam has lost \$120 billion in revenue because of them, thereby slowing his ability to

rebuild his military and develop his WMD programs. The UN has required that all of Iraq's oil exports be administered through the so-called oil-for-food deal (UNSCR 986). This restriction requires that all of Iraq's import purchases be approved by the UN and limits them to just food, medicines, and other humanitarian necessities. The oil-for-food deal, though well intentioned, has its limitations. Saddam has successfully identified many workarounds to the deal and has also smuggled oil to Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf States at a rate twice what it was in 1998.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Gary Milhollin, Executive Editor of *Iraq Watch*, estimates that the Iraqi regime may be smuggling out as much as \$2 billion worth of oil a year.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the oil smuggling, Iraq has also been able to acquire spare parts for its military apparatus through smuggled imports. Probably most amazingly of all, is China's flagrant violation of the UN sanctions and recent admission that it helped build a nationwide fiber-optic communications network in Iraq, although part of it was destroyed during U.S. airstrikes in January 2001.<sup>14</sup>

Sanctions and their effectiveness on containment have begun to show serious signs of weakness. Besides Saddam's flagrant smuggling, he has also successfully spread propaganda throughout the Arab and Western worlds, stating that sanctions have contributed to the death of more than a million of his people since 1991. There probably has been some negative humanitarian effect from sanctions but not to the degree that Saddam espouses; moreover, the oil-for-food deal was specifically developed to minimize it. In reality, Saddam has successfully diverted proceeds from the oil-for-food program and has used revenues from his smuggling operations for his own military aims. Additionally, there appears to be a growing number of countries willing to work outside of the UN Security Council restrictions, thereby subverting the sanctions and profiting from the smuggling.

**Intrusive UN Inspections of Iraq's WMD and Missiles:** Iraq has been consistently uncooperative in abiding by the UN Security Council resolution compelling them to “complete full, final and complete disclosure of its WMD programs.”<sup>15</sup> Even when UN inspectors were allowed to conduct their work prior to 1998, Iraq never was forthcoming with required information; they were deceptive, and even belligerent. There were instances when inspectors were even briefly detained while Iraqi officials ushered out banned materials from inspection sights. International support for inspections from the beginning has been mixed. Russia has a history of harshly criticizing the inspection process and only the British have consistently supported the U.S. position.<sup>16</sup> UN inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, and it has now become clear through numerous intelligence sources and defectors, that Saddam continues to advance his WMD and missile programs.

**Diplomatic Isolation:** Another key element of containment is Saddam's diplomatic isolation from the world. The U.S. and the UN have successfully isolated him to the point that he has lost significant credibility within his own country, but more specifically, he has lost significant credibility with the power base that surrounds him. Also, diplomatic isolation has successfully prevented him from exerting nonmilitary influence on his neighbors. Despite these successes though, it has become increasingly apparent that the community of nations is growing weary with diplomatic isolation.<sup>17</sup>

**Restricting Iraq's Deployment of Forces Through Military Means:** Saddam has been restricted in his ability to deploy his forces by the UN-created no-fly/no-drive zones in both northern and southern Iraq. Although there have been frequent unsuccessful engagements by his SAMs against UN aircraft patrolling these zones, Saddam's forces have been for the most part contained. Even though successful, there is a significant drawback to this element of

containment. U.S. military forces have been in the region supporting these patrols (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) for over eleven years now and it has begun to have an effect on U.S. readiness and morale, given the frequent requirements for rotation and lack of adequate training opportunities once deployed.

**Large Western Military Presence In the Gulf:** And finally, the large presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf and the continuous threat of military strikes, has been overall an effective element in keeping Saddam “in the box.”<sup>18</sup>

In order for U.S. post-Gulf War containment policy to work effectively it requires consistent support from the U.S. public, world powers, and key regional allies. Unfortunately, support has steadily waned in recent years and has therefore undermined containment. Economic sanctions for the most part are meaningless, and they receive increasingly less international support. Also, the UN inspection program has been nonexistent for four years and even when it was allowed to occur, it was less than effective. The threat from Saddam is clear and present. Although Saddam’s plans and intentions are unclear, he has demonstrated a propensity to acquire WMD despite world consensus (through the UN) that he disarm. Clearly a new strategy is needed to successfully accomplish our national interests and objectives vis-à-vis Iraq.

### **Constraints**

Before our discussion moves to recommendations for a strategy to meet the threat, we must look at a few constraints that effect U.S. policy development in the Gulf.

**Fear of Iraqi Fragmentation:** U.S. policy has long feared the total collapse of the Iraqi state brought upon by Saddam’s sudden fall from power and without a definitive successor inline to replace him. Iraq consists essentially of three ethnic groups: ethnic Kurds (Sunni Muslims) who

make up 20 percent of the population and live in the mountains to the North, Sunni Arabs (including Saddam) making up 16 percent of the population and dominate central Iraq as far south as Baghdad, and Shiite Muslims who make up two-thirds of the population and live in the slums of Baghdad and southern Iraq.<sup>19</sup> These distinct groups would potentially struggle violently for power following a sudden departure of Saddam, with no guarantee of them easily reaching agreement on the eventual territory that which they will occupy. Iraq's descent into chaos would further aggravate the humanitarian crisis, especially the Shiites who have benefited very little from the oil-for-food program. Iraq's collapse could also potentially spread instability to neighboring Turkey and Iran. For these reasons, the U.S. policy towards Iraq has always been one that would prevent destabilization.

**Preserving International Cooperation:** U.S. policy has long shown that it strongly values the maintenance of good healthy cooperation with other countries. The UN inspections and sanctions on Iraq are two examples where strong international support manifested by alliances is absolutely critical for success. Although the U.S. recognizes the need to develop an international consensus to legitimize its policies, by doing so, it often places constraints on its freedom of action. The U.S. must then compromise or soften its policies in an effort to maintain the anti-Iraq alliance.<sup>20</sup> This concept is playing out in the UN today with France and Russia disagreeing with the U.S. wording on a new UN resolution that will compel Iraq to admit inspectors after a four-year absence. The U.S. may very well find itself having to compromise and tone down its aggressive policy toward Iraq for the sake of maintaining its current coalition.

### **Recommendations To Meet The Threat**

From the preceding strategic analysis, one can easily conclude that the Post-Gulf War policy of containment towards Iraq has failed. Saddam, who many believed should have fallen

from power long ago, is still a dangerous and unpredictable tyrant whose quest for WMD is stronger than ever. One would ask then if the containment policy can be resuscitated? Maybe, but that would require a completely new set of rules for the employment of sanctions. To start, the general sanctions would need to be lifted and the UN food-for oil program eliminated. Financial controls and the military embargo would need to be kept in place along with severe penalties for violators and preauthorized use of force by the U.S. to compel Iraqi compliance. Of course this revised plan would need to be approved by the UN Security Council and the likelihood of that is minimal, given the past record of appeasement by several of the members.<sup>21</sup>

What about deterrence then? According to Kenneth Pollack of the Council on Foreign Relations, an effort to deter would require the complete abandonment of all the restraints presently levied on Saddam and then to rely “solely on the threat of U.S. intervention to dissuade Saddam from future aggression.”<sup>22</sup> Although such an approach would likely win huge support from outside the U.S., it runs unacceptable risks. Most would agree that Saddam is a rational actor but that his tendency to take huge risks despite incredible odds makes deterrence an unacceptable option for the U.S. and its allies.

Therefore, the most logical strategy at this point, short of military conflict and thus a complete regime change by force, are renewed but significantly stricter UN inspections coupled with an effort to oust Saddam by covert means. The UN is presently debating the renewed inspection regime option. The U.S. is insistent, as it should be, that Iraq be given one more opportunity within a constrained timeline to allow inspectors to dismantle and achieve complete accountability of all WMD and ballistic missiles. If Iraq does not comply, then the UN should preauthorize the use of military force to seek its objectives. The U.S. should also insist that the inspectors be provided no-notice complete access to any site that it believes potentially housing

or supporting WMD. Also, the UN should authorize aerial surveillance (possibly helicopters or UAVs) during the inspection process to ensure contraband isn't ushered out the back door while inspectors are held at the front. Additionally, the UN should also authorize the interview, outside of Iraq, of key scientist/technicians who have admitted or are suspected of working with WMD programs. To encourage forthrightness and truth, the U.S. should grant asylum to those who voluntarily come forward with worthwhile information.

Running in parallel with the renewed UN inspection process, the U.S. should immediately launch covert action aimed at the overthrow of Saddam. The U.S. should seek out a potential defecting army general, one that could bring forward his entire unit—a division or more—of Iraqi troops. Although outnumbered among Iraq's large army, the defecting troops and leader could then work with U.S. forces (most likely covert special forces) to persuade other units to defect and or capture Saddam.<sup>23</sup> This recommended course of action has a good probability of accomplishing a successful regime change without Iraq falling into total chaos and hopefully a regime more favorable than Saddam's.

### **Use Of Force**

The remainder of this essay will assume that the nonmilitary strategy recommended above was implemented but failed in its effort to remove Saddam from power and eliminate his WMD. The UN inspectors reentered Iraq but were once again faced with continued uncooperative and deceptive Iraqi authorities. Also, the recommended covert operation was unsuccessful because Saddam's internal security machine was found to be too effective and resistant to any potential military coup. Therefore at this point, there is no choice but to use military force to achieve our stated objectives. What follows is a strategic analysis of the planned war against Iraq. The framework for discussion will focus on the following six key elements: (1) political setting and

stated/implicit objectives, (2) military strategic setting, (3) military objectives, (4) military capabilities and vulnerabilities, (5) the strategic concept, and (6) potential results.

**Political Setting and Stated/Implicit Objectives:**

The stated political objectives remain the same as were presented earlier in this essay: (1) preventing Iraq from gaining regional influence, particularly over the oil-rich Gulf states; (2) stopping Iraq from building WMD [including ballistic missiles]; (3) removing Saddam from power; and (4) preserving the stability of U.S. allies in the region.

Obviously though, the objective of removing Saddam from power has gained a new sense of urgency. For purposes of this analysis we will assume that the UN Security Council has approved a resolution on the use of force to remove Saddam and to destroy his WMD. Implicit in the objective of removing Saddam from power is the requirement to reestablish a viable government within Iraq following the military invasion and Saddam's departure. This new stable government will be essential to maintain stability in the region in the years ahead.

An additional critical consideration in this discussion of political setting is to ascertain Israel's position on whether they would react offensively if they were to be attacked by Iraq. During the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. led coalition was successful in preventing an Israeli counter-attack following an Iraqi attack by relatively benign conventional Scud missiles. Attempting to once again gain Israel's neutrality may prove extraordinarily difficult especially if it were to be attacked this time by chemical or biological weapons. This scenario is actually quite possible if Saddam becomes desperate, sees that his survivability is in jeopardy, and realizes he has nothing to lose. The U.S. must recognize that conditions could potentially exist for an uncontrolled escalation i.e. an Israeli nuclear retaliatory response. Therefore, the U.S.



should make every effort before hostilities commence to assure Israel that the U.S. and its allies will do everything possible to eliminate the threat.

**Military Strategic Setting:**

An important question that needs to be answered in our analysis is whether military operations are appropriate to achieve the stated and implied political objectives given the current and anticipated strategic setting? The answer to this question is “yes,” assuming that the U.S. is successful in building an international coalition—one that is in complete agreement that Saddam must be removed from power by using military force. Although the U.S. could “go it alone,” possibly with the British by its side, we would be perceived as the aggressors without total coalition support. An international coalition, united in its agreement on what needs to be done, provides legitimacy to the operation. Coalition action will also give the added benefit of offsetting the tremendous costs in terms of material resources and personnel. Although limited in nature, the war must be quick, decisive, and overwhelming.

**Military Objectives:**

Our stated military objectives are rather obvious and stem from the political objectives earlier defined—(1) removal of Saddam Hussein from power (either dead or alive) and (2) the complete destruction of all of Iraq’s WMD. Implied in these objectives however, is the requirement for a military led occupation of Iraq following cessation of hostilities. Occupation would be necessary until a viable form of government is reestablished within Iraq.

An important consideration in our military objective analysis is identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity. Iraq’s critical center of gravity is the tight power base that surrounds Saddam i.e. the Republican and Special Republican Guard units. These units are also an implied military objective. Since Saddam is completely dependent on these units for his security and survival,

military force should be focused on eliminating them as a center of gravity. Additional centers of gravity include his command and control/telecom structures, air defense network, and also his military industry.<sup>24</sup> The allied center of gravity on the other hand is the allied coalition itself. Saddam's aim will be to fracture the coalition either through propaganda that turns the Arab world against the West or through an extensive urban warfare-type war of attrition.

### **Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:**

The essential question that needs to be answered when assessing capabilities and vulnerabilities, is whether the stated and implied military objectives can be achieved with current capabilities or ones that can be brought online in an acceptable timeframe? The bottom line here is that the U.S. and its allies are extraordinarily capable. We've done it before in Iraq and we can do it again. In fact, the U.S. is even more capable now than it was in 1991 during the first Gulf War. Stealth, precision guided, and standoff weapons have had an exponential increase in their capability and lethality. The balance of force between U.S. and Iraq is no doubt in extreme favor of the U.S. and its allies, despite Iraq's military rebuilding efforts since the end of the first Gulf War.

In order to succeed with its objectives, the U.S. and its allies will need to launch an overwhelming combined use of force that capitalizes on all its forces—air, land, sea, space, and SOF. The U.S. and its allies do have vulnerabilities though, and Iraq will without a doubt attempt to capitalize on them. Iraq has no doubt learned much from the last time it fought this formidable force. Iraq realizes that a strategy of annihilation in the open desert is futile and will seek to avoid that scenario. It can be expected that Iraq will attempt to pull the allied ground forces into Baghdad, home to Saddam and his elite Republican Guard forces. This will serve two purposes. It will not only pit Iraq's best forces against the allied forces but it will do so in an

urban area vice the open desert. Risk of urban warfare is huge. U.S. forces are ill prepared to face combat in this scenario. They will be forced to go door-to-door to hunt the enemy and there is a tremendous risk for serious, collateral damage and allied/civilian casualties. The media will no doubt capitalize on this desperate situation and could potentially undermine the accomplishment of our military objectives.

**Strategic Concept:**

This portion of our strategic analysis of the military campaign now looks at whether the strategy contemplated is appropriate for the assumed conduct of the conflict, character of the enemy and the level of resources necessary and available? Allied forces can expect to use a similar strategy that was used in the first Gulf War. Iraq is a relatively well-developed, industrial country that is very susceptible to a well-planned and overwhelming campaign. Iraq will be struck in a manner that air power theorist John Warden termed “strategic paralysis.” In the opening hour of the campaign the enemy’s “eyes and ears” will be knocked out with an overwhelming, parallel attack on his command and control nodes and air defense sectors. Simultaneously, allied SOF will be inserted to begin knocking out all known ballistic missile and WMD sites that threaten invading forces and Israel. An extensive air campaign of air interdiction and aerial bombardment will follow; targeting airfields, enemy personnel and their equipment, and critical military industry. Allied forces will quickly win air supremacy and will have reduced considerably the enemy’s ability to wage war. Following successful preparation of the battlefield, allied ground forces and close air support will engage the bewildered Iraqi army. U.S.-trained Iraqi opposition forces, inserted into Iraq at the start of battle for purpose of overthrowing Saddam, will also advance. The Iraqi defeat will soon follow.

**Potential Results:**

The final portion of our analysis examines what is the likely outcome for the proposed military strategy and does this outcome satisfy our stated and implied political objectives? To answer this question as it applies towards our Iraqi military strategy, we need to make several assumptions. First, the allied coalition remains strong throughout the campaign despite Iraqi pressure to fracture it. Second, Israel does not become involved in the war despite possible Iraqi provocation to do so. Israel's neutrality will help keep Arab allied coalition members unified. Third, Iraq refrains from using WMD on invading forces. If Iraq became desperate, it could possibly decide to use its vast supply of chemical and biological weapons against allied forces. Although allied forces have some measure of protection against some of these agents, allied casualties could potentially be severe. And fourth, Saddam is overthrown and defeated prior to the need to have allied forces invade Baghdad. As previously mentioned, if invasion of Baghdad should become necessary, allied forces are ill trained to conduct urban warfare. The potential costs to the allied forces would likely be severe.

Assuming that the above assumptions held true and Saddam was successfully overthrown, the logical question is what next? Better known as the "end state" strategy, end state should be well thought out in advance. In fact, planning for the end state process must be integrated in the campaign planning process. Participants should include not only the U.S. Department of Defense but also the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency For International Development, Red Cross/Red Crescent, and other Non-Governmental agencies (NGOs) with a stake in the rebuilding of Iraq. Other allied agencies will likely want to participate as well. The U.S. should take the lead (at least initially) in the effort to maintain order and stability. Stabilization forces should also be represented by the UN. A sequenced, logical plan should then be initiated that works towards putting in place a democratically elected leader as a replacement for Saddam.

Extraordinary effort should be made to ensure that all tribal factions within Iraq are represented in this new electoral process. i.e. the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiites., among others.

In addition to stabilizing Iraq, rebuilding key infrastructure nodes that were destroyed during the war, and assisting in the institution of a new government, Iraq's WMD should be completely accounted for and destroyed. Also, assuming Iraq remains committed towards reform, it should be diplomatically recognized within the UN and all economic sanctions and active UN Security Council Resolutions should be rescinded.

### **Conclusion**

This essay described a strategic analysis of the failed policy of containment utilizing the analytical framework of *ends, means, and ways*. It began with a discussion of the U.S. national interests and objectives with regard to Iraq—the *ends*—and the assumptions in the domestic and international environments that influenced their development. It then continued with an in-depth analysis of the threat, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion then turned to the instruments of state power—the *means*—and how they have been applied—the *ways*—towards the Iraqi regime since the end of the Gulf War in an effort to achieve *the ends*. The policy of containment was then critically examined and some thoughts as to why it has failed were offered. Finally, analysis concluded with a discussion of some of the constraints that impinge upon the U.S.'s ability to have freedom of action in the Gulf region and that continue to limit its ability to develop renewed policy options. Part one of the essay concluded with a recommended non-military strategy offered as a potential solution to the current Iraqi dilemma.

The second part of this essay assumed that the previously recommended strategy did not achieve the desired results and that the use of military force became necessary. A second strategic analysis was conducted that specifically addressed the impending use of military force.

The six-step military framework was used for the purpose of this analysis. The framework included: Political and military setting, stated/implied political and military objectives, military capabilities and vulnerabilities, strategic concept, and potential results. All elements were analytically discussed in an effort to think through the use of force option before actual hostilities commence.

## **End Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002, p1.

<sup>2</sup> Byman, Daniel, and Waxman, Matthew, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, 2000 RAND, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1146/>, p23.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.24.

<sup>4</sup> *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program*, CIA official unclassified document, October 2002, p.3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p.2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pp. 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H., *Iraq's Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, But Dangerous, Poisonous Sake*, Center For Strategic and International Studies, December 2001, pp. 2 and 5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p.5

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Byman, Daniel, and Waxman, Matthew, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, 2000 RAND, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1146/>, p26.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> Domowitz, Susan, U.S. Department of State, *Analysts Say Saddam Still Armed and Dangerous*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/offtxts/0924sadm.htm>

<sup>14</sup> Pollack, Kenneth M., *Next Stop Baghdad*, Foreign Affairs, April 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/Pollack0302.html>

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<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, *Iraq's Obligations*,  
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/comply.htm>

<sup>16</sup> Byman, Daniel, and Waxman, Matthew, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, 2000 RAND, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1146/>, p27.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.27.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p.26.

<sup>19</sup> Smyth, Frank, *Iraq's Forgotten Majority*, The New York Times, October, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Byman, Daniel, and Waxman, Matthew, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, 2000 RAND, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1146/>, p34.

<sup>21</sup> Pollack, Kenneth M., *Next Stop Baghdad*, Foreign Affairs, April 2002,  
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/Pollack0302.html>

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Lumpkin, John J., *U.S. Covert Action Against Saddam Would Be Dicey Prospect, Experts Say*,  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020806-iraq2.htm>

<sup>24</sup> Hoyt, Timothy D., *Iraq's Military: A Critical Strategic Target*, National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1998, <http://wwwnpec-web.org/published/critical.htm>